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Abstract—This work provides a formalized model-invariant
safety system for closed-loop anesthesia that uses feedback from
measured data for model falsification to reduce conservatism.
The safety system maintains predicted propofol plasma concen-
trations, as well as the patient’s blood pressure, within safety
bounds despite uncertainty in patient responses to propofol.
Model-invariant formal verification is used to formalize the
safety system. This technique requires a multi-model description
of model-uncertainty. Model-invariant verification considers all
possible dynamics of an uncertain system, and the resulting safety
system may be conservative for systems that do not exhibit
the worst case dynamical response. In this work, we employ
model falsification to reduce conservatism of the model-invariant
safety system. Members of a model set that characterizes model-
uncertainty are falsified if discrepancy between predictions of
those models and measured responses of the uncertain system is
established, thereby reducing model uncertainty. We show that
including falsification in a model-invariant safety system reduces
conservatism of the safety system.
Index Terms—Falsification, formal methods, safety-preserving
control, model invariance, closed-loop anesthesia, conservatism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliable operation of safety-critical control systems de-
mands a safety guarantee over the full spectrum of their
operational conditions. These applications include closed-loop
control of physiological variables [1], [2], flight envelop pro-
tection [3], and process control systems [4]. Formal methods
and safety-preserving control techniques provide us with pow-
erful tools to verify safety specifications and design systems
to guarantee safety [5]. These methods can be used to verify
feasibility of a set of viability constraints (safe region) for a
closed-loop system by calculating the viability kernel [6]. The
viability kernel is a set of states starting from which there
exists a control action which satisfies the constraints. Once
feasibility is demonstrated, a safety-preserving controller can
be synthesized to guarantee safety during operation [7] [8].
Formal methods and safety-preserving control techniques
are model-based analyses and require an accurate model that
describes the evolution of system’s states over time as a
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function of the system’s inputs. These methods have been
extended to handle uncertainty; however, the proposed solu-
tions are limited to stochastic and additive state uncertainty
[9], [10] and cannot be used for systems with multiplicative
model uncertainty. Although multiplicative uncertainty can
be expressed in the form of additive state uncertainty, this
may result in very conservative solutions or lead to an empty
viability kernel if the level of uncertainty is significant.
Closed-loop anesthesia is an example of safety-critical ap-
plications with multiplicative uncertainty. Closed-loop propo-
fol anesthesia manipulates propofol infusion rates (a com-
monly used hypnotic agent in intravenous anesthesia) based
on feedback of a measured clinical effect on depth of hypnosis
to induce and maintain a certain level of anesthesia [11].
Van Heusden et al. [1] proposed a safety system for closed-
loop anesthesia that maintains the propofol concentration in
the plasma and effect-site within the therapeutic window of
propofol. This minimizes the risk of drug under/overdosing.
Safety constraints on other physiological variables such as
blood pressure have also been suggested to improve patient
safety during closed-loop anesthesia [12]. To formalize these
safety systems and synthesize a safety-preserving controller,
an exact model of each patient is required. However, patient
models are uncertain. Model uncertainty in closed-loop anes-
thesia can be represented as multi-model uncertainty, assuming
the true patient response is included in the model set.
In this work, we propose a formalized safety system for
closed-loop anesthesia which guarantees that blood pressure
of individual patients remains within a safety bound de-
spite model-uncertainty. We previously introduced a model-
invariant verification technique that can be used to synthe-
size a safety-preserving controller for uncertain systems with
multiplicative uncertainty [13]. Given a multi-model descrip-
tion of model uncertainty, a model-invariant safety-preserving
controller satisfies constraints for all members of a model-
set. Model-invariant safety-preserving control relies on the
calculation of the model-invariant viability kernel. The model-
invariant viability kernel is a set of states starting from which
there exists a control input which satisfies safety constraints
for all members of the model set. We showed that the model-
invariant viability kernel is the intersection of the viability
kernels of all members of the model set. Conservatism of
model-invariant safety preserving control depends on the level
of model uncertainty. As the uncertainty increases, the size of
the model-invariant viability kernel decreases. Moreover, the
techniques used for viability kernel approximation may result
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2in further conservatism [14], [15].
Although safety-preserving control techniques rely on the
off-line calculation of the viability kernel and control synthe-
sis, the use of online data has been recommended to improve
performance of the formalized safety systems. For instance,
Gillula et al. [16] paired machine learning algorithms with
formal methods and achieved high tracking performance while
safety was guaranteed. In [17], they used the same approach to
learn disturbances online to reduce conservatism of formalized
safety systems. In this work, we employ online measurements
to decrease conservatism of model-invariant safety-preserving
control using model falsification [18]. Given a set of models
for an uncertain system, online data can be used to falsify
inappropriate members of the model set. This reduces model
uncertainty. Model falsification inherently deals with missing
data and limited excitation. If falsification criteria are not met,
no model will be falsified and safety will not be jeopardized.
In the context of the model-invariant safety preserving control,
as members of the model set are falsified, the model-invariant
viability kernel can be recalculated online as the intersection
of the viability kernels of unfalsified models. This yields less
conservative model-invariant safety-preserving control if the
viability kernels of the falsified models are more restrictive
compared to the viability kernel of the true system.
In this work, we use a model set we identified in [19], which
illustrates the effect of propofol infusion on blood pressure of
10 at-risk patients. We employ the model-invariant verification
technique and formalize a blood pressure safety system for
this population. The model-invariant formalized safety system
ensures that blood pressure of the patient remains within a
safety bound despite model uncertainty. In the next step, we
employ blood pressure measurement to falsify members of the
set to decrease the conservatism. Due to the lack of excitation,
blood pressure measurement cannot be used to identify the true
model of each patient. However, using clinical data, we show
that the blood pressure data can be used to falsify irrelevant
models.
Low blood pressure is common in the period immediately
following induction of anesthesia. However, it is unknown
whether closed-loop anesthesia can provide sufficient anesthe-
sia while avoiding hypotension for all patients, especially at-
risk patients. Van Heusden et al. [20] have recently identified
a set of models which relate propofol infusion rates to depth
of hypnosis for the same population discussed in [19]. This
model set enables us to study the feasibility of sufficient
anesthesia during closed-loop anesthesia in the presence of
the blood pressure safety system. This model set also helps us
to better demonstrate conservatism of the formalized model-
invariant safety system and the improvement we achieve in
terms of performance when falsification is included. This work
demonstrates a proof-of-concept for the blood pressure model-
invariant safety system which includes falsification. The results
discussed in this paper are limited to the above-mentioned
model set.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the
models used to describe the effects of propofol on patients.
This section also reviews the existing safety systems proposed
in the literature for closed-loop anesthesia. In Section III,
we describe model falsification and its efficiency in reducing
uncertainty of blood pressure models using clinical data.
In Section IV, we summarize the results of model-invariant
safety-preserving control which was introduced in [13]. In
Section V, we discuss the feasibility of adequate anesthesia in
the presence of the formalized model-invariant blood pressure
safety system as well as its conservatism. Furthermore, we
show how model falsification results in reduced conservatism
of the model-invariant safety system. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Modeling the clinical effect of propofol
Propofol is an intravenously administered anesthetic drug
commonly used in general anesthesia. The relation between
propofol and its effect on physiological variables is tradi-
tionally described by compartmental pharmacokinetics1 and
pharmocodynamics2 (PKPD) models [21]. The PK model
GPK(s) relates the propofol infusion rate u(t) to the plasma
concentration Cp(t) :
x˙(t) = APKx(t) +BPKu(t)
Cp(t) = CPKx(t). (1)
Propofol pharmacokinetics are usually described using a three
compartment model, corresponding to a state-space represen-
tation with three states, where x1(t) = Cp(t), and x2(t) and
x3(t) represent the drug concentrations in the fast and slow
compartments respectively.
The PD model GPD(s) relates the plasma concentration to
the drug effect, and typically includes a transfer function re-
lating the plasma concentration to the effect-site concentration
Ce,
Ce(s) =
ke0
s+ ke0
Cp(s) (2)
and the nonlinear Hill function relating the effect-site concen-
tration to the clinical effect [22]:
E(Ce) =
Cγe
ECγ50 + C
γ
e
, (3)
where EC50 denotes the drug effect-site concentration corre-
sponding to 50% of the maximal drug effect, and γ describes
the nonlinearity. PKPD models are used to guide drug dosing
and form the basis of target-controlled infusion (TCI) systems
[22].
Commonly used propofol PK models were identified from
data collected from healthy volunteers, e.g. [23]. Validation
and extension to a wider range of patient groups is ongoing,
see for example [24]. Pharmacodynamic models are specific
to the clinical effect. Most propofol PD models describe the
drug effect on the DoH, as used in TCI systems [22].
Studies quantifying the effect of propofol on blood pressure
(BP) are limited [25], [26]. Extrapolation based on the iden-
tified model dependency on age results in baseline systolic
pressure of 223 mmHg for a 60 year old patient, indicating
1Pharmacokinetics (PK) describes the distribution of drugs in the plasma.
2Pharmocodynamics (PD) relates drug concentration in the plasma to
clinical effects.
3significant overfitting and limited generalizability of the model
identified in [26]. Gentilini et al. [27] described the effect of
alfentanil on BP using a linear model.
It is known that the infusion rate significantly affects the de-
crease in arterial pressure during induction of anesthesia [28].
The pharmacodynamics on DoH does not vary significantly
with age [25], while the effect on BP is more pronounced
in elderly patients. Based on 12 patients aged 70-85y [25],
propofol EC50 for the drug effect on BP was ≈ 2 mcg/ml,
while EC50 for DoH was more than 7 mcg/ml. The pharmaco-
dynamics for DoH were faster than for BP. This result implies
that maintaining BP while providing sufficient DoH may
be challenging for these patients. This study was limited to
patients with ASA status I and II, and only propofol was given
during the study period. In clinical anesthesia, propofol is
administered in combination with an opioid, strongly reducing
EC50 for DoH.
These PKPD models describe population average drug re-
sponses. For the purpose of robust system development, the
response as well as the interpatient variability needs to be
quantified, including outlier behaviour [29]. We identified a
set of patient models describing the effect of propofol on
BP [19] for a subset of the population requiring continuous
BP monitoring using an arterial line. Continuous data during
induction of anesthesia were available for model identification,
providing adequate excitation for model identification. In this
model set, the blood pressure effect EBP (t) is defined as the
percentage of blood pressure decrease from the baseline mean
arterial blood pressure (BP (t)):
EBP (t) = 100
(
1− BP (t)
BP (t)
)
, (4)
We identified DoH effect models for the same patient popu-
lation [20], providing a model set describing both the DoH
and BP response to propofol infusion, in the presence of
remifentanil analgesia.
B. Safety systems for closed-loop propofol anesthesia
A robustly designed closed-loop system for propofol anes-
thesia will provide adequate anesthesia for the patient pop-
ulation considered [11]. To ensure safe drug administration,
including for extreme outlier behaviour and in the presence of
faults, we proposed a safety system that limits drug infusion
to bounds within the therapeutic window of propofol [1].
The proposed bounds are expected to be reached for outliers,
indicating the extreme patient response to the clinician, and
allowing the user to make a clinical decision without compro-
mising patient safety.
The use of safety constraints on additional physiological
variables that are affected by propofol infusion has been
proposed to improve system behaviour and safety for at-
risk patients [12]. Propofol commonly causes cardiovascular
depression and hypotension following induction of anesthesia
in manually controlled anesthesia. The pharmacodynamics of
the propofol effect on BP are different from the pharmacody-
namics of the effect on DoH, both in gain (EC50) and speed of
response (ke0). These differences can be exploited in a safety
system.
The safety systems proposed in [1] and [12] are formalized
in [30] and [31], respectively. These safety systems constrain
predicted propofol concentrations based on population average
models, as measures of these variables are not available in
current clinical practice. Individualizing these systems using
feedback is challenging since accurate patient models are
not available and model uncertainties are significant. Optimal
filtering techniques or state observers can therefore not be
employed for state estimation as suggested by [32].
C. Proposed safety system
This work aims to provide an individualized safety system
for blood pressure and formalize it based on the following
assumptions:
1) The PKPD models of individual patients are unknown.
2) A population-based PK model is available.
3) Individual patient’s PKPD models are described by
GPKPD(s) = GPK(s)GPD(s),
where GPK(s) is known and the blood pressure PD
model is known to be part of a finite set of models:
GPD(s) ∈ {Gi(s)| i = 1, . . . p}, (5)
4) A noisy measure of blood pressure is available.
5) The measurement noise is bounded and an upper limit
of this bound is known.
6) The PK states are not measurable.
7) The PK states can be predicted at all times.
8) The BP from all PD models in the finite set can be
simulated and predicted at all times.
In this work, we employ the blood pressure PKPD model set
identified in [19] to represent uncertainty in the blood pressure
response of patients to propofol and formalize a model-
invariant safety system [13]. This safety system is augmented
using feedback from the (noisy) blood pressure measurements
for model falsification. This safety system requires feedback
from all patient states. Since the PK states are not measurable,
a population based model is formulated based on demograph-
ics of each patient to predict the plasma concentration and
the other states of the PK model [33]. The state of the PD
model can be predicted for all models in the uncertainty set.
In addition, the noisy measure of blood pressure available to
the safety system is used to falsify members of the PD model
set to reduce model uncertainty and consequently conservatism
of the safety system.
III. BLOOD-PRESSURE MODEL FALSIFICATION IN
PROPOFOL ANESTHESIA
A. Falsification
The concept of model falsification was introduced in the
context of model validation for robust control [18]. Given
an a priori nominal model and uncertainty description, the
validation problem was cast as a falsification problem; if
measured time-domain data is inconsistent with the nominal
model and uncertainty bounds, it is falsified (or invalidated).
This methodology uses the philosophical principle that a
4scientific theory can never be proven to be true, but false
hypotheses can be falsified by observations [34].
The falsification concept has been used in, for example,
data-driven control [35], [36], robust adaptive control [37],
and multi-model switching control [38]. In biomedical appli-
cations, controller falsification has been proposed for control
of neuromuscular blockade [39]. If a finite number of mod-
els/controllers is considered, falsification requires verification
of consistency with data for each entry. This approach can
be computationally intensive if the initial model/controller
space is large or gridding is fine. An analytical approach
to controller falsification has been proposed [36] to reduce
the computational load and to extend the methodology to an
infinite set of candidate controllers.
B. Blood-pressure model falsification
In this section, we formulate a falsification policy which
will be used to falsify members of the BP model set identified
in [19] based on the following assumptions:
1) The patient’s PK model is known.
2) The patient’s BP PD model is unknown.
3) The patient’s BP PD model is a member of the BP PD
model set:
GPD(s) ∈MPD = {Gi(s)| i = 1, . . . 10}. (6)
4) A noisy measure of blood pressure is available.
5) The measurement noise is bounded and an upper limit
of this bound is known.
6) Outliers are removed from the measurements.
Assume that a patient’s measured blood pressure BP (t) is
generated as follows:
BP (t) = L−1{GPK(s)GPD(s)u(s) + n(s)}, (7)
where u(s) is the propofol infusion and n(s) describes the
bounded measurement noise. L−1{·} is the inverse Laplace
transform. GPK(s) is known, GPD(s) is unknown and sat-
isfies the assumption in equation (6). For each model Gi(s)
in the uncertainty set, a corresponding blood pressure can be
predicted:
BˆP i(t) = L−1{GPK(s)Gi(s)u(s)}. (8)
The following policy can then be used for model falsification.
Falsification policy: Gi(s) ∈MPD is falsified if
|BP (t)− BˆP i(t)| > γ, (9)
where γ is defined as
γ = max{|n(t)| | ∀t}. (10)
The assumptions that the patient’s BP model exists in the
model set and γ is known guarantee that the patient’s true
BP model is never falsified. For the BP PD model set, γ was
identified as the maximal error between the measurements and
model prediction for the 10 patients:
γ = 17%. (11)
The assumption that the patient’s model is a member of
the model set may not be realistic in practice, as no a priori
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Fig. 1. Examples of model falsification using clinical data; blue lines:
responses of unfalsified models; dashed red line: responses of falsified models;
black line: measured BP.
knowledge of the true patient model exists prior to induction
of anesthesia. However, to demonstrate the proof-of-concept,
this assumption guarantees that not all members of the model
set are falsified.
Fig. 1 shows two examples where clinical data was used
to falsify members of the BP model set. According to Fig. 1,
the first few minutes of measurement data contain sufficient
information to falsify outliers.
IV. MODEL-INVARIANT SAFETY-PRESERVING CONTROL
A. Safety-preserving control
Consider a system described by the following state-space
model:
X : x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (12)
where x(t) ∈ Rn and u(t) ∈ Rm are the states and input
vectors of the system, and A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rm×n describe
the system dynamics. Assume the input is constrained u(t) ∈
U ∈ Rm. A formalized safety system ensures that the system
states x(t) remain within a (safe) constraint set, x(t) ∈ K ⊂
Rn, over a certain period of time, t ∈ [0, τ ], where K and U
are convex compact sets.
Definition 1 (Safety-preserving control action). A control
input u(·) : [t, τ ] → U is safety preserving over [t, τ ] if it
maintains the states of X within the constraint set K for all
time in [t, τ ].
The viability kernel describes the system states for which
safety-preserving control action exists.
Definition 2 (Viability kernel). The finite-horizon viability
kernel of K for the system X is a subset of K characterizing
all states starting from which there exists a constrained control
input that maintains the states of X inside K for all time in
[t, τ ]:
V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X) = {xt ∈ K| x(t) = xt, ∃u(·) : [t, τ ]→ U
s.t. ∀t′ ∈ [t, τ ], x(t′) ∈ K}. (13)
5If the viability kernel is empty, the safety specification
cannot be met with any constrained input. In practice, the vi-
ability kernel needs to be approximated, see for example [14],
[15], [40]. If the approximated viability kernel is nonempty,
a safety-preserving controller can be found and a controller
can be synthesized that provides such safety-preserving control
action.
Kurzhanski et al. [41] showed that starting from any point in
V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X) the following control action usp is safety-
preserving over [t, τ ]:
usp(t) = arg min
u(t)∈U
{< l0 (x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X)) , Bu(t) >},
(14)
where
l0
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X)
)
= arg max
l
{< l, x(t) > −
ρ(l|V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X))| ‖l‖2 ≤ 1}. (15)
ρ(l|V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X)) is the support function of
V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X) in direction l:
ρ(l|V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X)) = max{< l, z > | z ∈
V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X)}. (16)
In the above equations, < ·, · >: Rn × Rn → R denotes the
inner product of vectors, and ‖ · ‖ : Rn → R is the 2-norm of
vectors. Kurzhanski et al. [41] proved that the control policy
(14) is safety-preserving over t ∈ [0, τ ] if V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X)
is non-empty for all t in [0, τ ].
Kaynama et al. [10] combined the above-mentioned safety-
preserving control law with a performance controller to pre-
serve safety while meeting performance criteria:
u(t) =
{
upr(t), x(t) ∈ ˘V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X),
usp(t), x(t) /∈ ˘V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X).
(17)
˘V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X) denotes the interior of V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X).
upr(t) is a control action provided by a performance con-
troller designed to meet performance criteria, and usp(t) is
calculated based on a safety-preserving control law (14). This
hybrid control policy guarantees safety while satisfying desired
closed-loop performance.
To prevent chattering in the control input, Kaynama et al.
[10] use a convex combination of upr(t) and usp(t) instead
of (17):
u(t) = (1− ζ)upr(t) + ζusp(t), (18)
where ζ is calculated as a function of the distance of x(t)
from the boundaries of V iab[t,τ ](K,U , X).
The viability kernel can be calculated offline. The safety
preserving control policy can be implemented in real-time,
using the pre-calculated viability kernel, the input matrix B
and feedback from the full system state x(t).
B. Model-invariant safety-preserving control
Safety-preserving control as outlined above is a model-
based method which requires an accurate system model.
Safety-preserving control of systems with uncertain models
and formal verification of such systems have only been dis-
cussed in the context of additive and stochastic uncertainties
(see [42], [10], [43] and [44]). These formal methods are not
directly applicable if the system dynamics (A,B in (12)), are
uncertain. While uncertainty can be translated into additive
uncertainty, this can introduce significant conservatism if the
uncertainty is large.
We introduced model-invariant safety-preserving control to
formalize safety for systems with multiplicative uncertainty
[13]. Consider the following multi-model uncertainty descrip-
tion M:
M = {Xi|Xi : x˙(t) = Aix(t) + αiBu(t), αi > 0, i = 1, . . . , p}.
(19)
Model-invariant safety-preserving control provides a control
action that keeps the states of any of the systems Xi ∈ M
within the safe set K.
Definition 3 (Model-invariant safety-preserving control ac-
tion). A control action u(·) : [t, τ ] → U is model-invariant
safety preserving over [t, τ ] if it maintains the states of all
members of M within the constraint set K for all time in
[t, τ ].
The corresponding model-invariant viability kernel is de-
fined as follows.
Definition 4 (Model-invariant viability kernel). The finite-
horizon model-invariant viability kernel of K for the model
set M is a subset of K which includes all initial conditions
starting from which there exists a constrained control input
that maintains the states of all members of M inside K for
all time in [t, τ ]:
V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) = {xt ∈ K| x(t) = xt,∃u(·) : [t, τ ]→ U ,
s.t. ∀Xi ∈M & ∀t′ ∈ [t, τ ], x(t′) ∈ K}. (20)
Let I[t,τ ] denote the intersection of the viability kernels of
all individual set members:
I[t,τ ] =
⋂
Xi∈M
V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xi). (21)
The following theorem formulates the main result of [13]:
Theorem 1. Consider the model set M defined in (19) and
safe region K. Assume the intersection of the viability kernels
of its individual members I[t,τ ] is not empty and that x(t) ∈
I[t,τ ]. Define the following control policy uspM (t)
uspM (t) = arg min
u(t)∈U
{< l0 (x(t), I[t,τ ]) , Bu(t) >}, (22)
where l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
is defined as (15). Then the control
policy uspM (t) is model-invariant safety-preserving.
Proof. For Xj ∈M, let define
V (t) = Dist2
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
)
, (23)
6where Dist
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
)
is the Hausdorff dis-
tance measuring the distance of x(t) from V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
[41]:
Dist
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
)
=
min{‖x(t)− v‖2| v ∈ V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)} =
max{< l, x(t) > −ρ(l|V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj))| ‖l‖2 ≤ 1} =
< l0
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
)
, x(t) > −
ρ(l0
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
) |V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)). (24)
Kurzhanski et al. [41] showed that assuming
d
dt
V (t) exists,
starting form any point in V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj) the following
control policy is safety preserving over [t, τ ] for Xj :
u(t) = arg min
u
{ d
dt
V (t)| u ∈ U}. (25)
Due to the fact that Dist
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
) ≥ 0, (25)
can be expressed as
u(t) = arg min
u(t)∈U
{ d
dt
Dist
(
x(t), V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj)
)}.
(26)
Since I[t,τ ] ⊆ V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj), we can use I[t,τ ] in (26)
as an under-approximation of V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj) and rewrite
the safety-preserving control policy (26) as:
u(t) = arg min
u
{ d
dt
Dist
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
) | u ∈ U}. (27)
Accordingly, starting from any point in I[t,τ ], (27) is safety
preserving over [t, τ ] for Xj . The derivative of the Hausdorff
distance can be simplified as
d
dt
Dist
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
=< l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
, x˙(t) >
− ∂
∂t
ρ(l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
) |I[t,τ ]). (28)
According to [41] and due to the fact I[t,τ ] ⊆
V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj), the partial derivative of the support func-
tion can be written as
∂
∂t
ρ(l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
) |I[t,τ ]) =< l0 (x(t), I[t,τ ]) , Ajx(t) > +
ρ(l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
) |αjBU). (29)
Substituting (29) in (28) yields
d
dt
Dist
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
=
< l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
, Ajx(t) + αjBu(t) > −
< l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
, Ajx(t) > −ρ(l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
) |αjBU) =
< l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
)
, αjBu(t) > −ρ(l0
(
x(t), I[t,τ ]
) |αjBU).
(30)
Consequently, we can express (27) as
u(t) = arg min
u(t)∈U
{< l0 (x(t), I[t,τ ]) , αjBu(t) >}. (31)
Due to the fact that αi > 0 and (31) is convex, the minimizer
of (31) is independent of αi. Thus, we can simplify (31) to
the following optimization problem:
u(t) = arg min
u(t)∈U
{< l0 (x(t), I[t,τ ]) , Bu(t) >}. (32)
Since I[t,τ ] ⊆ V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xi) for all Xi ∈M, (29) holds
for all members ofM and (27) simplifies to (32) for all Xi ∈
M. Thus, (32) maintains the states of all members ofM over
[0, τ ] within K. Consequently, according to Definition 3, (32)
is model-invariant safety preserving.
It follows by definition that the intersection is a subset of
the model-invariant viability kernel:
I[t,τ ] ⊆ V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M). (33)
Note that B in (19) is known, I[t,τ ] can be calculated offline,
the model-invariant safety-preserving control policy uspM (t)
can be implemented in real-time using feedback from the
measured state x(t), and the same model-invariant safety-
preserving controller can be used for any system Xi ∈M.
Corollary 1.
V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) = I[t,τ ]. (34)
Proof. According to (33), to show (34) holds, it is sufficient
to show that
V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) ⊆ I[t,τ ]. (35)
Suppose (35) does not hold:
V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) 6⊆ I[t,τ ]. (36)
Accordingly,
∃x′ ∈ V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) s.t. x′ 6∈ I[t,τ ]. (37)
Due to the fact that I[t,τ ] =
⋂
Xi∈M V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xi), (37)
implies that
∃Xj ∈M s.t. x′ 6∈ V iab[t,τ ](K,U , Xj). (38)
Therefore, starting from x′ there is no safety-preserving con-
trol action to preserve safety of Xj over [t, τ ]. According to
the definition of the model-invariant viability kernel (Definition
4), x′ cannot be a member of V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M). This means
6 ∃x′ ∈ V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) s.t. x′ 6∈ I[t,τ ]. (39)
Equation (39) contradicts the assumption that (35) does not
hold. Therefore, (35) holds by contradiction. Comparing (33)
and (35) yields
V iab[t,τ ](K,U ,M) = I[t,τ ]. (40)
V. FALSIFIED ROBUST SAFETY-PRESERVING CONTROL OF
PROPOFOL ANESTHESIA
While a priori information is insufficient to establish which
individual model Xi is controlled, data collected during opera-
tion can be used to reduce the uncertainty and consequently the
conservatism introduced by model-invariant safety-preserving
control.
This scheme takes advantage of the characteristics of falsifi-
cation, where limited excitation and missing data are dealt with
naturally. If the data does not contain sufficient information to
determine consistency with the model, it cannot be falsified.
7While in this situation falsification may not reduce conser-
vatism, it does not affect the safety of model-invariant safety-
preserving control. When data is missing due to for example
sensor faults, there is no information to determine consistency
and again, no model can be falsified. These characteristics
are particularly important in biomedical applications, where
excitation is limited and missing data is not uncommon.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method,
closed-loop anesthesia is simulated using three safety systems:
1) Closed-loop anesthesia with an individualized safety
system. This safety system formalizes individualized
safety constraints assuming the patient models are
known. This scheme results in minimum conservatism
as we assume the patient models are known and there
is no model uncertainty, however, this assumption is not
realistic in practice.
2) Closed-loop anesthesia with a model-invariant safety
system. This safety system guarantees safety for all
patient responses included in the model set, can be
implemented in practice, but introduces significant con-
servatism.
3) Closed-loop anesthesia with a model-invariant safety
system using falsification. This formalized safety system
includes feedback from the measured blood pressure
response to falsify models, as proposed in this paper.
This system can be implemented in practice and it is
shown that it significantly reduces conservatism.
The recommended range of the DoH index during general
anesthesia is 40-60 [45]. The index of 50 is mostly targeted in
closed-loop anesthesia [46]. However, it is unknown if the
index of 50 is achievable for all patients including at-risk
patients in the presence of blood pressure constraints. In this
work, we study feasibility of sufficient anesthesia (DoH index
of 50) in the presence of various blood pressure constraints.
A. Simulation results
1) Closed-loop anesthesia with an individualized safety
system: Here, we formalize a blood pressure safety system
for each patient assuming:
1) The BP (and DoH) PKPD model is known for each
patient.
2) All states of the PKPD model are measurable or pre-
dicted.
3) There is no measurement noise.
The above assumptions are sufficient to formalize an individ-
ualized safety system with minimum conservatism. However,
existing methods to approximate the viability kernel can result
in a certain level of conservatism. Maiden et al. in [15]
compared conservatism of these methods. In this paper, we
employ convex polytopes to represent constraint sets. We use
the Multi-Parametric Toolbox 3.0 [47] to conduct operations
on polytopes to calculate the viability kernel. We use the
the recursive approach developed in [15] to approximate the
viability kernel.
We employ the set of 9 BP PKPD models identified in
[19] for which van Heusden et al. [20] identified DoH PKPD
models. We use the BP PKPD model of each patient to
PID( Pa+ent(Safety(System(
PKPD(
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Fig. 3. Comparing DoH of the patients with different constraints on BP,
achieved after 20 min from the start of the closed-loop administration of
propofol with the individualized safety system.
formalize a blood pressure safety system for that specific
patient. We employ the corresponding DoH PKPD models
to simulate the response of each patient during closed-loop
anesthesia and in the presence of the BP safety system. We
employ the safety constraints proposed in [1] which limit the
PK states to the therapeutic window of propofol:
Cp, x2, x3 ∈ [0, 10mg/l]. (41)
The following constraint on the infusion rate of propofol is
also suggested in [1]:
u(t) ∈ [0, 600ml/h]. (42)
We discuss three different constraints on BP:
BP drop ≤ 30%, 40%, 50%. (43)
We employ the PID controller robustly tuned by Dumont
et al. [48] to achieve the closed-loop goal. We include back-
calculation anti-windup suggested by van Heusden et al. [1]
to improve the performance of the PID controller when the
safety constraints are active. For each patient, we formalize the
safety system to guarantee that the states of the PKPD model
remain within the safety constraints. The viability kernels of
the patient models are given in [19]. Fig. 2 illustrates the block
diagram of the implemented system in simulation.
Fig. 3 shows the box plot of the DoH index of patients with
different constraints on BP decrease at t = 20min following
8Fig. 4. The closed-loop responses of the patients with BP decrease limited
to 50% (individualized safety system).
the start of propofol infusion. Induction of anesthesia cannot
be completed for all cases when the BP decrease is limited to
30% and 40% 3. In contrast, when the BP decrease is limited
to 50%, induction of anesthesia can be completed in all cases.
Fig. 4 shows the closed-loop responses of the patients with
the bound on BP decrease at 50%.
2) Closed-loop anesthesia with a model-invariant safety
system: In the previous section, we showed that all patients
could achieve a DoH index between 40 and 60 when 50%
decrease in blood pressure is allowed. In this section, we
formalize a model-invariant viability kernel for the same
population based on the assumption discussed in section II-C.
We assume the PK model of each patient is known [33].
We assume the patient’s BP PD model is unknown, however
it is part of the model set identified in [19]. We calculate the
model-invariant viability kernel according to this multi-model
uncertainty description.
We limit blood pressure decrease to be less than 50% and
use the constraints defined in (41) and (42) on the states of
the PK model and the infusion rate. The calculated model-
invariant viability kernel under the mentioned assumptions is
given in [19]. The resulting model-invariant safety-preserving
controller requires feedback from all states of the BP model.
The states of the patient PK model are assumed known, and
can be predicted. The PD model on the other hand is uncertain,
unknown, and cannot be predicted for each patient.
3The induction of anesthesia is completed if DoH goes below 60 and stays
there for more than 30s.
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Fig. 5. Block diagram of the closed-loop anesthesia with the model-invariant
safety system.
Although we assume a noisy measure of blood pressure is
available, this measurement can not be used as feedback to the
model-invariant safety-preserving control. A limited number
of solutions have been proposed in literature to deal with
measurement noise in safety-preserving control schemes (e.g.
[32],[49]). These solutions rely on formulating a state-observer
which requires a known model of a system. To the best of
our knowledge, safety-preserving control in the presence of
measurement noise as well as model-uncertainty has not been
discussed in literature.
In this paper, we therefore employ the worst case prediction
of blood pressure decrease as feedback to the model-invariant
safety-preserving control. We define the worst case blood
pressure decrease BP ↓wc as follows:
BP ↓wc = arg max
BP↓i
{ |BP ↓i | | i = 1, . . . , 9}, (44)
where BP ↓i is the blood pressure decrease predicted using the
ith member of the BP model set. The model-invariant safety-
preserving control maintains the states of all members of the
model set within the safe region. According to the definition of
the worst case blood pressure decrease, the control input which
keeps BP ↓wc less than 50%, maintains all BP
↓
i s below 50%.
Consequently, since we assume that the true blood pressure
model of the patients exists in the model set, maintaining
the worst case predicted blood pressure decrease below 50%
guarantees that the decrease in blood pressure of each patient
stays within the safe range. Fig. 5 illustrates the block diagram
of the implemented system in simulation.
The bottom plot in Fig. 6 shows blood pressure decrease of
all patients using the model-invariant safety system. The safety
system maintains the blood pressure of all patients within
the safe bound. However, the safety system does not allow
the closed-loop controller to complete induction of anesthesia
for the majority of the population. The model-invariant safety
system introduces significant conservatism compared to the
individualized safety system (see Fig. 9).
3) Closed-loop anesthesia with a model-invariant safety
system using falsification: The model-invariant viability kernel
is calculated as the intersection of the viability kernels of
all individual members of the model set. Accordingly, if
the viability kernel of one of the models is restrictive, the
model-invariant safety system restricts the drug infusion for all
patients. In Section III, we showed that clinical blood pressure
data during the first minutes following the start of propofol
infusion contain sufficient information to falsify outliers. By
falsifying restrictive models in the model set, and recalculating
9Fig. 6. The closed-loop responses of the patients with BP decrease limited
to 50% (model-invariant safety system).
the model-invariant viability kernel as the intersection of the
remaining models, conservatism of model-invariant safety-
preserving control can be reduced. If no model is falsified,
the model-invariant viability kernel remains unchanged and
safety is not compromised.
Here, we employ the model-invariant safety system we
formalized in the previous section, but instead of calculating
the model invariant viability kernel off-line, we calculate it
online. At each sample time, we falsify a member of the
model set if the difference between its simulated response
and the measured BP is bigger than a certain threshold.
Then, we calculate the model-invariant viability kernel (the
intersection) with the viability kernel of the falsified model
removed. We specify the threshold according to equation (11).
Furthermore, the worst case predicted blood pressure decrease,
which is defined in (44), is selected from the predictions of the
unfalsified models. Fig. 7 illustrates the block diagram of the
implemented closed-loop anesthesia with the model-invariant
safety system with falsification.
Fig. 8 illustrates the closed-loop responses of the patients
when the model-invariant safety system with falsification is
in place. Accordingly, induction of anesthesia is completed
in all cases and DoH reaches an index between 40-60 for
all patients. Comparing Fig. 6 and Fig, 8 depicts a signifi-
cant improvement in the performance of the model-invariant
safety system when falsification is included. Fig. 9 compares
conservatism of the safety systems discussed in this work.
The individualized safety system maintains safety with min-
imum conservatism while the model-invariant safety system
Controller( Pa+ent(Safety(System(
PK(
model(
ref( infusion(rate(
C P
, (x
2,(
x 3
(
PD(
models(
Cp(
BPwc(
DoH(
n(t)(
BP(
Falsifica+on(
{PD}(
Fig. 7. Block diagram of the closed-loop anesthesia with the model-invariant
safety system including falsification.
Fig. 8. The closed-loop responses of the patients with BP decrease limited
to 50% (individualized safety system including falsification).
significantly increases conservatism. However, adding model
falsification to the model-invariant safety system significantly
decreases conservatism of the model-invariant safety system
and brings it to the conservatism level of the individualized
safety system.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a model-invariant safety system for
closed-loop anesthesia that guarantees to maintain the patient’s
blood pressure within a safety bound despite inter-patient
variability. We have proposed to use model falsification to
reduce the conservatism introduced in model-invariant safety-
preserving control. The effectiveness of blood pressure model
falsification is shown using clinical data. The effectiveness
of the proposed model-invariant safety-preserving control ap-
proach is demonstrated in simulation. Augmenting the model-
invariant safety-preserving controller using feedback from
noisy blood pressure measurements for model falsification
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Fig. 9. Comparing DoH of the patients with different BP safety systems,
achieved after 20 min from the start of the closed-loop administration of
propofol: (1) the individualized safety system; (2) the model-invariant safety
system, (3) the model-invariant safety system including falsification.
significantly reduces conservatism introduced by the uncer-
tainty. Model-falsification reduces this model uncertainty and
subsequently decreases conservatism of the model-invariant
safety system.
We have presented this work as a proof-of-concept of
a model-invariant safety system for closed-loop anesthesia
which includes model-falsification. The proposed solution is
limited by the assumption that patient models exist in a known,
finite model set, and that all outliers are removed from the data
prior to falsification. To generalize the results of this paper to
cases in which these assumptions are not met, further research
is required.
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